STRATIGMA
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE — ISTANBUL

STRATIGMA L'AFRIQUE
Monthly series of pan-African strategic analysis · English edition

Ankara, the Third Way

Türkiye's Offer to Francophone Africa

Türkiye's offer described through its instruments and legal framework, measured by its results and assessed by the criteria applied to France, Russia, Algeria, China and the United States.

ISSUE 5 — NOVEMBER 2026

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Summary

This issue appears during COP31, held in Antalya from 9 to 20 November 2026, and four weeks before the fourth Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit, convened in Tripoli on 8-9 December. In 2026 Ankara signed a protocol with Niger on the deployment of military instructors (7 April), held the first session of a strategic cooperation council with Algeria (7 May), received General Tiani on his first trip outside Africa (3-5 June), opened political consultations with Burkina Faso and obtained ratification of the 2019 maritime memorandum by the parliament in eastern Libya (20 October), then organised in Bamako, with the Malian Ministry of Defence, the second edition of a defence exhibition (9-13 November). The issue describes Türkiye's offer to Francophone Africa, sets out its legal framework and Ankara's official positions, measures the results and applies to Türkiye the three criteria established in the September issue: a service rather than a presence, no stake in the internal balance of partner states, and a verifiable transfer of skills. The same criteria are applied, in a single table, to France, Russia, Algeria, China and the United States. The expression "third way", by which this offer is commonly described, is treated as a hypothesis to be tested. The review reaches three conclusions. Türkiye's offer covers the widest range of instruments among the Sahel's non-Western partners, on an economic scale smaller than China's. It meets the three criteria in part. And its main exposures stem not from Ankara's intentions but from four factors it controls only partially: the use client armies make of the equipment delivered, the decision-making chain into which that equipment is inserted in Mali, the third-country licences on which some components depend, and the absence of a detailed public response on several contested files.

Key findings

- The network: 44 embassies against 12 in 2002; 62 cities in 41 countries served by Turkish Airlines; 22 offices of the cooperation agency TİKA; military framework agreements with 35 African states; and trade close to $40 billion in 2025 according to the Turkish Ministry of Trade.
- The distribution: North Africa accounts for most of that trade. In sub-Saharan Francophone Africa volumes remain modest (in the order of $400-500 million with Senegal, $273 million with Niger) and the presence rests on infrastructure concessions and civilian facilities.
- Security: 11% of sub-Saharan Africa's imports of major arms in 2021-2025 according to SIPRI; TB2 and Akıncı drones in service in all three AES states; a protocol on in-country training in Niger; a drone facility at Abéché in Chad.
- The framework: arms exports require ministerial authorisation and an end-user certificate. Türkiye signed the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013 and has not ratified it. No public text describes the conditions of use attached to sales of armed drones.
- The assessment: no Turkish participation in an internal power struggle is documented in Francophone Africa. The physical presence is growing. Maintenance and part of the operation of the systems remain dependent on the supplier.
- The exposures: in Mali, according to The Sentry, Turkish drones operate within a chain in which Russian officers approve strikes. Drone strikes that killed civilians are documented in Burkina Faso and Mali. In Chad, according to AFP, aircraft were grounded over unpaid bills. The allegations concerning the company SADAT are denied and have not been clarified.

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- The comparison: China and the United States offer the same states different formats. China offers equipment and investment without a presence; the United States offers intelligence and seeks access to minerals. The Sahel states combine these offers rather than substituting one for another.

PUBLISHER'S POSITION

Stratigma is based in Istanbul and works, among others, for Turkish decision-makers and institutions. This issue deals with the policy of the country in which the firm is based.

The assessment criteria are those the series applied to France (Issue 1) and to Russia and Algeria (Issue 3). They are applied here without adjustment, then extended to China and the United States.

Elements favourable and unfavourable to Türkiye's offer are presented under the same rule of evidence. For each contested file the text states the source, what it establishes, what it does not establish, and the response of the Turkish authorities where one exists. Annex 3 provides the full record.

Official discourse, whether Turkish, French, Russian, Chinese or American, is treated as an instrument of positioning in a competition between powers in which Africa is one of the arenas, not as a description of results.

This text is the English edition of an issue published in French. In case of discrepancy, the French text prevails.

I. The apparatus: diplomacy, networks, trade

Türkiye's Africa policy derives from a dated and documented decision of state: the Action Plan for Opening to Africa in 1998, the “Year of Africa” in 2005, the status of strategic partner of the African Union in 2008, then three partnership summits (Istanbul 2008, Malabo 2014, Istanbul 2021). According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs data reported by Anadolu Agency, the diplomatic network grew from 12 embassies in 2002 to 44 in 2024; the stated target is 50. Thirty-eight African states have an embassy in Ankara, against 10 in 2008. According to the Turkish authorities, President Erdoğan has made more than fifty visits to 31 countries on the continent. To this are added commercial attachés in 31 countries, against 4 in 2003, and 48 bilateral business councils within the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK).

This state network is backed by public and semi-public operators. Turkish Airlines serves 62 cities in 41 African countries. The cooperation agency TİKA has 22 offices on the continent; the Yunus Emre cultural institute has 18 centres in 15 countries. The Maarif Foundation, created by law in 2016, educates about 25,000 pupils in more than 230 institutions across 27 African countries; it runs most of the schools that the Fethullah Gülen movement had opened on the continent and whose transfer Ankara obtained after 2016. About 62,000 African students were enrolled in Turkish higher education at the end of 2024. The public broadcaster TRT Afrika has aired since 2023 in French, English, Swahili and Hausa. The 2026 study by Bayram Balcı and Issouf Binaté on Türkiye in West Africa (CERI-Sciences Po) identifies three drivers of this presence: diplomacy, religion and networks.

Trade between Türkiye and Africa rose from $5.4 billion in 2003 to nearly $40 billion in 2025, according to figures presented on 3 November 2026 by the Minister of Trade, Ömer Bolat: about $24 billion of Turkish exports and $16 billion of imports. Exports to the continent reached $13.3 billion in the first seven months of 2026, up 12.6% year on year. The official target is $50 billion of trade in 2028. Turkish contractors have carried out 2,118 projects on the continent, for a cumulative value of about $105 billion. The stock of direct investment is far smaller: $7-10 billion

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according to official statements. Türkiye has concluded trade and economic cooperation agreements with 50 African states, investment protection agreements with 33 and free trade agreements with 5.

These volumes are unevenly distributed. North Africa accounted for about 65% of Türkiye-Africa trade in 2010-2019 and remains the leading partner group: Algeria, Morocco and Egypt are the main markets, and trade with Algeria alone exceeds $6 billion. In sub-Saharan Francophone Africa the orders of magnitude are different. Trade with Senegal stood at about 250 billion CFA francs in 2024, or some $400-500 million, against a joint target of $1 billion; trade with Niger amounts to $273 million. Türkiye's economic presence in this area rests less on trade than on infrastructure concessions. In Senegal, the Limak-Summa consortium completed Blaise Diagne International Airport and operates it, together with the public company AIBD, under a 25-year concession awarded in 2016. In Niger, Summa modernised Niamey's Diori Hamani airport under a public-private partnership, delivered it in 2019 and manages it; the runway was extended to 3,800 metres in 2022. In Guinea, Albayrak has held the concession for the conventional terminal of the port of Conakry since 2018 and was selected in 2023 for the extension of the capital's airport. These concessions place Turkish companies in charge of facilities on which the host states depend for their external access. The bilateral frameworks are recent: a joint commission with Senegal, which met for the sixth time in Dakar in April 2026; a joint economic and trade committee with Niger, established in June 2026.

The civilian dimension. It is the least discussed and the oldest. In Niger, the Niger-Türkiye Friendship Hospital, built by TİKA following Mr Erdoğan's visit to Niamey in January 2013, operates under joint management. The protocol on its joint operation and transfer was renewed in Ankara on 4 June 2026 by the two health ministers, and General Tiani publicly asked for its services to be extended. TİKA also works in Niger on irrigation, agriculture and livestock. TİKA's Dakar office has a regional remit covering Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde. According to the chair of DEİK's Türkiye-Niger Business Council, about 500 Turkish nationals live in Niger. These elements do not alter the economic orders of magnitude. In the capitals concerned, however, they are the part of Türkiye's offer that the population encounters directly, and the part the Nigerien authorities chose to cite alongside defence.

Financing. This is the narrowest link in the apparatus. Türk Eximbank, the public export credit agency, is targeting $59 billion of support in 2026 across all markets. At the end of 2023 it became the first non-African sovereign shareholder of the Africa Finance Corporation, with which it had concluded a co-financing agreement, and in April 2026 that institution granted a $300 million loan to the Turkish power producer Aksa Enerji for its African plants. These instruments serve the financing of commercial projects. To date there is no Turkish public instrument comparable to Chinese state loans or to the Gulf's sovereign funds, and an analysis published in August 2026 by the research centre SETA, which is close to the government, notes that Türkiye cannot match the major financiers in volume and that its advantage lies in partnership models.

The official vocabulary that accompanies this apparatus (equal partnership, mutual respect, win-win, absence of a colonial past) is part of the offer and must be analysed as such. Türkiye operates in Africa in a space where several outside powers are simultaneously seeking to increase their influence. Its discourse positions it within that competition, just as French, Russian, Chinese and American discourse positions its authors. It is a political and commercial argument; it is not a measure of results.

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TÜRKIYE'S OFFER IN AFRICA: KEY FIGURES

Network: 44 embassies (12 in 2002) · 38 African embassies in Ankara · commercial attachés in 31 countries · 48 DEİK business councils · 62 cities in 41 countries for Turkish Airlines · 22 TİKA offices · about 25,000 Maarif pupils in 27 countries.

Economy: nearly $40 billion of trade in 2025 ($5.4 billion in 2003) · 2,118 construction projects worth about $105 billion in total · $7-10 billion of direct investment · target of $50 billion of trade in 2028.

Defence: military framework agreements with 35 African states, training agreements with 21, defence industry agreements with 29 · 11% of sub-Saharan Africa's imports of major arms in 2021-2025, behind China (22%) and Russia (12%), according to SIPRI.

COP31 AND THE CLIMATE DIMENSION

COP31 is being held in Antalya from 9 to 20 November 2026 under Türkiye's presidency, with Australia leading the negotiations; COP32 has been awarded to Ethiopia. Türkiye is listed in Annex I of the Framework Convention but not in Annex II: it is not subject to the financing obligations of developed countries.

According to SETA's analysis (August 2026), Africa receives about 3% of global climate finance and borrows for its clean-energy projects at rates of 15-18%, against 2-5% in Europe and the United States. The African Group is calling for adaptation finance to be tripled.

The same analysis proposes a Türkiye-Africa climate cooperation mechanism linking COP31 to COP32: pilot countries, sectoral working groups, adaptation of the Turkish YEKA tender model with local-content requirements, early warning, irrigation. At the time of writing, this proposal does not have the status of a government commitment.

This dimension corresponds to established Turkish capacities (renewables, storage, irrigation) and to a stated African demand. Its reach will depend on its financing, which is the weak point noted above.

II. The security offer: equipment, training, presence

Armaments are the segment in which Türkiye's advance is fastest. According to SIPRI data published in March 2026, Türkiye supplied 11% of the major arms imported by sub-Saharan Africa in 2021-2025, behind China (22%) and Russia (12%); it is the world's eleventh-largest exporter, with 1.8% of transfers. Its defence and aerospace exports exceeded $10 billion in 2025. Baykar's African customers include Angola, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria and Togo.

In the three AES states, deliveries began in 2022 with the Bayraktar TB2: six aircraft for Niger that year, and first deliveries to Mali in December. Mali fielded at least seventeen at the start of 2024 and has operated the higher-end Akıncı since late 2024; a further handover took place at Sévaré at the end of July 2026. Burkina Faso received about a dozen TB2s and Akıncıs in April 2024. Niger also has Hürkuş light aircraft and armoured vehicles delivered in 2021-2022. In Chad, Hürkuş aircraft and Anka and Aksungur drones were delivered in 2023-2024. The reasons for the choice are set out by the buyers themselves: short delivery times, absence of political conditionality, and an acquisition price of between $2 million and $5 million for a TB2. They match the diagnosis these states had made of the Western offer, which the September issue described in connection with the Russian choice.

Training is the second format. Malian and Nigerien soldiers completed a special forces course in Isparta in June 2026. Niger and Türkiye have been bound since 2020 by a military training and

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cooperation agreement. On 7 April 2026 the Turkish and Nigerien defence ministers signed in Ankara a protocol providing for the deployment of Turkish instructors to Nigerien bases; numbers, timetable and locations have not been published. Middle East Eye, which revealed the plan in September 2025, referred to commandos and special forces personnel who had served in Syria and Iraq, tasked with training and advising without taking part in combat operations; the scale reported varies between accounts. The Critical Threats Project describes Niger as Türkiye's anchor state in the Sahel. A military and financial cooperation agreement was concluded with Niger in July 2025; an additional protocol of the same kind was signed with Senegal in August 2025.

The third format is presence. Outside the Francophone area it is long-standing: in Somalia, the TURKSOM training centre has operated since 2017, at least 16,000 Somali soldiers have been trained there, the Turkish contingent rose from about 400 to 800 personnel in early 2025 and parliament has authorised a ceiling of 2,500; in Libya, Turkish forces have been stationed in the west since 2020. In the Francophone area it is recent: following an agreement concluded in January 2025, Türkiye uses the former French facility at Abéché, in eastern Chad, for drone operations, with advisers and operators. The Nigerien protocol of April 2026 is the second case.

The BAMEX exhibition illustrates the method. Organised in Bamako from 9 to 13 November 2026 by the Turkish company The Peak Defense with the Malian Ministry of Defence, its second edition brought together more than twenty Turkish companies, including Baykar, Aselsan and Roketsan, together with Chinese, German and Sudanese exhibitors and delegations from some forty African states, around a programme devoted to arms procurement and local production. Baykar displayed its Kızılelma unmanned combat aircraft in Malian livery; no order was announced. The permanent secretary of Mali's National Security Council, General Yamoussa Camara, told Anadolu Agency there that cooperation among the AES states was not sufficient to meet their security needs and had to be supplemented by deeper cooperation with Türkiye. On 10 November, on the margins of the exhibition, the commander of US Africa Command was received by the Malian head of state.

THE SECURITY OFFER: THREE FORMATS

Equipment: TB2 and Akıncı drones (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Togo), Anka and Aksungur (Chad), Hürkuş aircraft (Niger, Chad), armoured vehicles; BAMEX exhibition in Bamako (2025, 2026).

Training: courses in Türkiye (Malian and Nigerien special forces, Isparta, June 2026); in-country training planned in Niger (protocol of 7 April 2026); military and financial cooperation agreements (Niger, Senegal).

Presence: drone facility at Abéché (Chad, since 2025); outside the Francophone area, the TURKSOM centre in Somalia (2017) and the deployment in western Libya (2020).

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III. The legal framework and Türkiye's official positions

Assessing a security offer requires knowing the rules the supplier applies to itself and what it says about its own action. This section sets them out as published.

The export regime. Law No. 5201 of 2004 places the production and export of war materiel included on an annual list under the control of the Ministry of National Defence; export authorisation is issued by that ministry after the opinions of the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The implementing regulation requires an end-user certificate, endorsed by the competent authority of the purchasing state, by which the buyer undertakes not to re-transfer the materiel without the seller's approval. Türkiye is a founding member of the Wassenaar Arrangement (1996) and reports its transfers each year to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms; it states that it applies all Security Council embargoes. It signed the Arms Trade Treaty on 2 July 2013; according to its Ministry of Foreign Affairs the ratification procedure is ongoing, and its delegation told the 2023 and 2025 Conferences of States Parties that it observes the Treaty's objectives and principles. Türkiye is therefore not bound by the risk assessment that the Treaty requires before any export. Neither the United States nor Russia is a party to the Treaty; China acceded in 2020.

What this framework does not cover. The end-user certificate concerns re-export, not use. No public text describes the conditions of use attached to sales of armed drones, the buyer's reporting obligations or the consequences of use contrary to international humanitarian law. The only contract whose content has been made public, that of the Malian Akıncıs, published by Jeune Afrique and analysed by The Sentry, exempts the manufacturer from liability for damage arising from the use of the aircraft (Article 18). This gap is not specific to Türkiye: Russian and Chinese sales to the same states carry no public conditions either. It nevertheless distinguishes Türkiye's offer from the European and Canadian regimes, and it deprives Ankara of an argument when the use of its equipment is called into question.

The stated doctrine. During General Tiani's visit, on 4 June 2026, President Erdoğan reiterated that Türkiye develops its relations with African countries on the basis of equal partnership, mutual respect and win-win principles, and said that it stands with friendly countries in the fight against the terrorist organisations destabilising the Sahel. In an interview with CNN Türk on 2 July 2026, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hakan Fidan, described Türkiye's approach as regional states taking ownership of their region's problems, an approach applied in the Caucasus and the Balkans and, in his words, one that Türkiye is trying to apply in Africa. He cited Libya and the countries to its south among the areas where Türkiye conducts an active foreign policy, and Africa among the subjects now raised in consultations with Russia. In his budget speech to parliament he ranked the African partnership among the most dynamic elements of Turkish foreign policy. These statements establish two points: Ankara itself describes its African action as a foreign, economic and security policy, and it treats the Russian presence in Africa as a subject of dialogue with Moscow.

Responses to the allegations. On the alleged dispatch of Syrian fighters to Niger, the Turkish Ministry of National Defence told AFP in May 2024 that these claims were false. SADAT told the BBC in July 2024 that it conducts no activity in Niger. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, approached by the BBC, did not reply. On Sudan, Ankara denies providing drones directly to the Sudanese army, in the wording used by Chatham House in May 2026. On Somalia, the Turkish authorities rejected in May 2026 the suggestion that their military presence serves one political faction. On the drone strikes that killed civilians in Burkina Faso and Mali, on the Malian

contract and on the decision-making chain described by The Sentry, we have identified no public statement by the Turkish authorities or the manufacturer at the time of writing.

IV. The central Sahel: state of relations with the three AES states

Mali. The relationship is first of all an equipment relationship. It is documented by the report that The Sentry published on 16 September 2026 on the basis of the Akıncı contract. The contract, worth $210 million for six aircraft, was signed on 15 August 2024 not by the Ministry of Defence but by the director general of the National Agency for State Security (ANSE), Colonel Modibo Koné, whose service reports directly to the head of state. The 2024 finance law allocated ANSE about $30 million, one-seventh of the contract value; The Sentry states that it found no public account of where the funds came from. Article 19 treats Baykar's inability to obtain an export licence for a component or for the system as force majeure, allowing the company to withdraw without liability. Mali has no equivalent clause, and neither acts of government, nor sanctions, nor a coup suspend its obligation to pay.

The same report describes how the aircraft are used. They are operated by the Malian armed forces, with Turkish support in training and assistance; Baykar does not operate them. The Africa Corps, for its part, operates Su-24M bombers. An earlier investigation by the same organisation concludes that strike approvals run up to Russian officers, and testimonies describe Turkish drones observing targets subsequently struck by Russian jets. These elements rest on a single source and have not been corroborated. If they are accurate, Turkish systems, paid for by a service attached to the Malian presidency, are being used within a decision-making chain in which the Russian command is involved. The recommendations of the report that we have identified are addressed neither to Türkiye nor to the manufacturer: they ask the states that license components (Ukraine and Canada are cited) to review those licences, and the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia to sanction Mr Koné. Bamako's main security partner remains Russia, whose contingent is estimated at 2,000-2,500 personnel. Ankara condemned the attacks of 25 April 2026. Analysts interviewed by RFI consider direct Turkish intervention unlikely and envisage the dispatch of advisers if Bamako were to request it; they note that the Malian authorities are seeking to reduce their dependence on Moscow.

Niger. The relationship is the most diversified of the three. It comprises the 2020 training agreement, a mining memorandum signed in October 2024 that facilitates Turkish companies' access to gold and uranium, the 2025 military and financial agreement, the April 2026 protocol on instructors and the four texts signed during General Tiani's visit to Ankara on 3-5 June 2026: a joint economic and trade committee, higher education for 2026-2030, the operation of the Friendship Hospital, and diplomatic consultations. According to the Turkish side, the talks covered defence, security, energy, mining, trade, investment, education, health and agriculture, as well as military training and intelligence. This visit was the Nigerien head of state's first trip outside Africa since 2023. Niamey now has three external security partners with distinct functions: Russia, whose Africa Corps is stationed at Air Base 101 and helped put down the mutiny of 28-29 August; Algeria, which sent combat aircraft on 30 August, signed a military cooperation protocol on 21 October and began deploying troops at the end of October; and Türkiye, which supplied the drone fleet and is to provide in-country training.

Burkina Faso. The relationship remains the least formalised. Turkish drones have been in service there since 2022 and the authorities publicly attribute to them a central role in the conduct of operations. The first session of political consultations between the two countries was held in Ankara on 20 October 2026; the Turkish side expressed its wish to conclude a defence

and security agreement, and the next session is planned for Ouagadougou in 2027.

In all three countries, Türkiye's offer is added to the Russian deployment; it does not replace it. None of the three capitals has presented the Turkish partnership as an alternative to the Africa Corps. No public document establishes operational coordination between Ankara and Moscow in this theatre; the Turkish foreign minister has, however, indicated that Africa is among the subjects of consultation between the two capitals. An analyst at Control Risks, Beverly Ochieng, told RFI that Russian paramilitaries in Mali had procured equipment through Türkiye; this information has not been confirmed elsewhere. The configuration observed is the one the August issue described: states that spread their dependencies across several suppliers, each covering one function.

V. Two external parameters: Libya and Algeria

Libya is the African country where Türkiye's engagement is oldest and heaviest. The maritime delimitation memorandum signed in November 2019 with the Tripoli government, followed by the military intervention of 2020, had placed Ankara in a single camp. Since 2025 Türkiye has dealt with both authorities: the reception of Saddam Haftar in Ankara, training programmes for the eastern forces, and the Turkish defence minister's meetings with Saddam Haftar and with Tripoli's deputy defence minister on the margins of the SAHA 2026 exhibition. On 20 October 2026 the House of Representatives sitting in the east unanimously ratified the 2019 memorandum, which it had rejected six years earlier, and repealed its 2020 decisions severing relations with Ankara. Its former speaker, Aguila Saleh, who opposed the text, had been removed at the beginning of the month.

The legal dispute. Both sides of it must be set out. For Greece, Türkiye and Libya do not have opposite or adjacent coasts, and the line ignores the rights that Crete and the other Greek islands derive from the law of the sea. The European Union has held since December 2019 that the memorandum infringes the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the law of the sea and cannot produce legal consequences for third states. Egypt rejected the ratification on 21 October. For Türkiye, which is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, delimitation is governed by the principle of equity, islands cannot deprive a mainland state of its continental shelf, and the agreement was concluded with the Libyan government recognised by the United Nations. Ratification by the east removes the opponents' argument that Libyan parliamentary approval was lacking; it does not change the position of third states. For the African states invited to Tripoli, this dispute lies outside their direct interests. It does, however, shape part of Türkiye's relations with the European Union and Egypt, two of their partners.

Two consequences matter for Francophone Africa. The first is the summit itself: the fourth Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit will be held in Tripoli on 8-9 December 2026, pursuant to a decision taken at the African Union in February 2025 and a host agreement signed in July 2026; the Turkish press reports that President Erdoğan will attend. The second concerns Russian logistics. The September issue established that the Africa Corps' resupply in the Sahel transits through bases in the area held by the Haftar camp. Türkiye now has an established relationship with each of the two Libyan authorities, including the one on which that corridor depends. No public element indicates that Ankara has sought to use this position against the Russian deployment; the two presences coexist in Libya as they coexist in Mali.

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Algeria is both Türkiye's leading economic partner in Africa and a Sahel security actor whose role has changed in three months. Presidents Tebboune and Erdoğan co-chaired in Ankara, on 7 May 2026, the first session of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council and set a target of $10 billion in trade. More than 1,600 Turkish companies are established in Algeria, and the Sahel is on the agenda of bilateral political consultations. Since the Niamey mutiny, Algiers has successively sent four combat aircraft (30 August), signed a military cooperation protocol with Niger (21 October), obtained parliamentary authorisation for a deployment (25 October) and sent a military column across the border at the end of October, which the regional press presents as the Algerian army's first engagement abroad since 1973. The European Union has asked for clarification of the basis and objectives of the operation.

The September issue noted that Algeria's offer met the series' criteria while carrying the interests of a neighbouring state. The move, within two months, from delivering capabilities to deploying troops confirms that reservation. The comparison with Türkiye concerns the structure of interests. Algeria shares with Niger and Mali borders, gas pipeline and trans-Saharan road projects, and disputes: in April 2025 its air defence shot down a Malian Akıncı drone, which caused a fifteen-month rupture with Bamako. Türkiye has neither a border nor an infrastructure project of its own in the area; its interests there are commercial, mining and industrial. This difference reduces for Ankara the risk of a territorial dispute with its partners; it also reduces its interest in committing forces on the ground. Ankara's relations with Algiers, Niamey and Bamako run simultaneously, and Turkish equipment has already been at the centre of a dispute between two of those capitals.

VI. The other offers: China and the United States by the same criteria

The series has assessed France, Russia and Algeria. Two partners have not yet been examined in their own right. They are assessed briefly here, because Türkiye's offer cannot be situated without them.

China. It is the leading supplier of major arms to sub-Saharan Africa (22% in 2021-2025). In the central Sahel, the state group Norinco concluded with Mali, in September 2024, an agreement covering equipment, training and technology transfer. Yitian-L air defence systems were delivered to Mali via Guinea until early 2026, and Sky Dragon 30 systems appeared in Burkina Faso in September 2026. China maintains no military presence in the area. Its weight is first of all economic: two lithium mines in southern Mali, and more than $30 million of aid to Burkina Faso in 2025. A study by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (July 2026) describes China as Burkina Faso's material centre of gravity. Applied to this offer, the criteria give the following result: the first is met, since the offer involves no presence; the second is met on the facts, no Chinese participation in an internal power struggle being documented; the third is announced in the Norinco agreement and cannot be verified to date. The limits are of another kind: the Africa Center for Strategic Studies notes less stringent export controls and the diversion of arms to armed groups, and the dependence created is financial and mining-related rather than military. China's discourse of non-interference and of rejecting competition between powers is, like the others, an instrument of positioning: China competes directly with Türkiye in the arms segment, and its manufacturers exhibited at the Bamako show.

The United States. After withdrawing from Niger in 2024, Washington reopened channels with the three AES states. Sanctions on Mali's defence minister and several officials were lifted on 27 February 2026. The State Department's senior official for Africa, Nick Checker, visited Bamako,

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Ouagadougou and Niamey in March. The resumption of surveillance flights over Mali is under negotiation. The commander of US Africa Command, General Dagvin Anderson, was received by General Goïta in Bamako on 10 November 2026, with no agreement announced. The American offer, as reported, combines intelligence with access to minerals (uranium, lithium, gold). It has not yet taken shape and can only be assessed prospectively: aerial intelligence is a service within the meaning of the first criterion; the abandonment of political conditionality brings the American offer closer to those of its competitors; no transfer of skills is mentioned. For Ankara this return has two effects. It introduces an intelligence provider whose means exceed those of any other partner. It also confirms that Türkiye's NATO membership gives it no intermediary role that Washington would consider necessary: the United States deals directly with Bamako.

Security offers in the central Sahel by the series' three criteria

Partner	Dominant format	1. Service rather than presence	2. Internal balance	3. Verifiable transfer
France	Bases and operations until 2022-2025; since then, training and intelligence (Chad)	Not met in the earlier format; current format limited to service	Contested by the states concerned; the reason for the break	Long-standing training; autonomy not achieved by the end of the period
Russia	Africa Corps contingents (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso)	Not met: the presence is the service	Not met: intervention in Niamey on 28-29 August 2026	Limited
Algeria	Air support, military protocol, deployment in Niger (October 2026)	Met until August 2026; changing since	Intervention at the authorities' request; interests of a neighbouring state	Training offered; too recent to measure
China	Arms, mining investment, aid; no presence	Met	Met on the facts	Announced (Norinco-Mali agreement, 2024); not verifiable
United States	Offer under negotiation: aerial intelligence, minerals	A service, if the agreement is concluded	Conditionality lifted in 2026	Not mentioned
Türkiye	Drones, training, civilian networks; Abéché facility, instructors planned in Niger	Largely met; presence growing	Met on the established facts; reservations (ANSE contract, SADAT)	Partially met

Reading note: the assessments of France, Russia and Algeria summarise Issues 1 and 3; those of China and the United States are made in this section; that of Türkiye is justified in Section VII.

VII. Assessment of Türkiye's offer by the series' criteria

The September issue formulated three requirements that the Sahel states are in a position to address to any security partner. They are applied here to Türkiye, on the basis of public information only.

First criterion: a service rather than a presence. Most of Türkiye's offer in Francophone Africa is a service: equipment sales, training in Türkiye, technical assistance. Türkiye maintains no garrison there assigned to protecting a government. The physical presence is nevertheless growing: the Abéché facility since 2025, and the instructors planned for Nigerien bases under the 2026 protocol, whose numbers are not public. The criterion is largely met, with a development in the opposite direction that will need to be monitored. The Somali precedent

indicates the possible trajectory: a training centre opened in 2017, a contingent doubled in 2025, a parliamentary ceiling of 2,500 personnel.

Second criterion: no stake in the internal balance. No source reports the participation of Turkish forces in an internal confrontation within a partner state in Francophone Africa. In Niamey on 28-29 August the outcome was determined by the Africa Corps and then consolidated by Algeria; no Turkish intervention is reported. Three elements qualify this finding. The Malian Akıncı contract was concluded by the security service attached to the presidency and not by the Ministry of Defence, which places this equipment as close as possible to the centre of power. The private company SADAT is the subject of repeated allegations: the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights attributes to it the recruitment of some 1,000-1,100 Syrian fighters sent to Niger since late 2023 to guard economic sites, and Jeune Afrique reported in 2024 that it had trained units in Mali responsible for protecting the head of state. SADAT and the Turkish Ministry of National Defence deny this, and the information has not been independently verified. Lastly, outside the Francophone area, a Chatham House study of October 2026 notes that Türkiye is perceived in Somalia as backing the federal government and that parts of the opposition question its neutrality, which Ankara rejects. The criterion is met on the established facts. It would not be met if the allegations concerning SADAT were confirmed, and the Somali case shows that a lasting presence comes to be read as taking a side.

Third criterion: a verifiable transfer of skills. The courses in Türkiye, the in-country training planned in Niger and the local-production theme chosen for BAMEX 2026 point in this direction. The available information on the use of the equipment nevertheless indicates persistent dependence. In Chad, according to AFP, the piloting and maintenance of the drones are partly carried out by Turkish operators. In Mali, Turkish support in training and assistance continues, and Article 19 of the contract makes the availability of the system dependent on third-country export licences over which neither Bamako nor Ankara has control. No public element indicates that any client state in Francophone Africa currently has an autonomous capacity to keep these aircraft operational. The criterion is partially met.

On the expression “third way”. It is accurate in that it distinguishes Türkiye's offer from that of the former colonial power, whose historical liabilities in sub-Saharan Africa and whose base format it does not share, and from that of Russia, whose function of protecting regimes it does not perform. It is inaccurate if it suggests a relationship of a different nature. Asked in 2025, the historian Issouf Binaté considered that Türkiye's strategy did not differ fundamentally, in its content, from those of France or China. The table in Section VI further shows that Türkiye is not alone on this path: China meets the first two criteria more clearly than Türkiye does, without a presence and with greater financial means. What distinguishes Türkiye's offer is the combination, within a single partner, of armaments, training, infrastructure concessions, the school and the hospital. Its main effect, for partner states, is to increase the number of options among which they choose.

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SUMMARY OF THE ASSESSMENT

Service rather than presence: largely met. No protection garrison; a facility at Abéché and instructors planned in Niger.

No stake in the internal balance: met on the established facts. Reservations: the Malian contract concluded by the state security service; allegations concerning SADAT, denied and unverified; a perception of partiality in Somalia.

Verifiable transfer of skills: partially met. Training is delivered; maintenance and, in Chad, operation still depend on the supplier; components are subject to third-country licences.

VIII. Limits and open files

Economic weight in Francophone Africa. The continent-wide indicators are not reflected in this area. Trade with Senegal and Niger combined represents less than 2% of Türkiye-Africa trade; the $1 billion target with Dakar implies a doubling. Trade is in surplus for Türkiye, by some $8 billion continent-wide in 2025. At the Türkiye-Africa Business Forum in October 2025, the president of the African Business Council asked that the partnership rest on investment, technology transfer and industrialisation. The stock of direct investment bears no comparison with the volume of construction contracts, which are paid services and not contributions of capital.

The cost of use. The Chadian case is the best documented. According to Le Monde, the Anka and Aksungur drones delivered in 2024 proved too costly for N'Djamena to operate. According to a source cited by AFP on 1 October 2026, some aircraft were grounded on several occasions because of $50 million in unpaid bills, which a senior Chadian officer denies. At the same time, Chad has since spring 2026 resumed discreet cooperation with France, covering training and intelligence, without a permanent base. In Mali, the value of the Akıncı contract is about seven times the annual budget of the agency that signed it, and its financing cannot be traced in the public accounts. The acquisition price of the TB2 is low; the cost of ownership of the heavier systems is not, and Türkiye's offer does not, to date, include a public mechanism for financing that cost.

Effectiveness. Drones have given the Sahelian armies an air capability that they hold themselves. They have not altered the course of the conflict. In Mali, the fuel blockade imposed by JNIM since September 2025, the coordinated attacks of 25 April 2026 and the loss of Kidal occurred when these aircraft had been in service for more than three years. General Camara's statement at BAMEX acknowledges this. Equipment is a condition for regaining the initiative, not a sufficient condition. Türkiye does not propose to take charge of the conduct of operations, and no Sahelian state is asking it to.

Use of the equipment and civilian casualties. The established facts are as follows. In Burkina Faso, Human Rights Watch attributed to the army's TB2 drones three strikes that killed at least 60 civilians between August and November 2023. In Mali, the organisation documented army drone strikes at Guimbé on 25 April 2026 (twelve children and teenagers killed), at Tené on 17 May (ten adults), on a health centre in the Kidal region on 29 July, on the Tombonkoré cattle market in the Bandiagara region on 19 August (six men killed, about twenty injured) and at Guélédié in the Mopti region on 16 September (eight civilians killed). It does not specify the type of aircraft and recalls that Mali operates TB2s and Akıncıs. Amnesty International documented two strikes at Amasrakad in March 2024 (at least thirteen civilians killed, seven of them

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children). According to ACLED data cited by Human Rights Watch, Malian forces and the Africa Corps carried out 47 drone strikes resulting in 94 civilian deaths between April and August 2026, against 22 strikes and 44 deaths a year earlier. Over three years, The Sentry counts 731 civilian deaths in 199 air strikes. The letters Human Rights Watch sent to the Malian and Russian authorities went unanswered.

These strikes are decided and carried out by the national armies; no published investigation implicates the manufacturer or Turkish personnel in the choice of targets. The responsibility of the exporting state is of a different order from that of a contingent taking part in operations. It is not nil, however, and it has three concrete effects. The first is legal: the request, addressed to third states, to review component licences targets the manufacturer's supply chain. The Canadian precedent, in which licences for sensors used on TB2s were suspended in 2020 and the restriction was lifted only after 2024, shows that this lever has already been used. The second is political: in Mali, the distinction between Türkiye's offer and the Russian deployment, on which the idea of a third way rests, disappears if Turkish aircraft operate within a decision-making chain involving Russian officers. The third concerns security: JNIM, which in 2024 called for a halt to Turkish drone sales, names Türkiye in its communications, which exposes Turkish nationals, schools, construction sites and concessions in the region.

Unclarified files. The allegations concerning SADAT rest on a limited number of sources, the main one being an organisation that monitors the Syrian conflict, and they are denied. They have nonetheless been repeated for two years by the press and by research centres, including in publications in partner states, and the absence of a detailed public response keeps them in circulation. The Sudanese file, though outside the Francophone area, has effects within it. In March 2025 the Washington Post published documents relating to a $120 million contract between Baykar and Sudan's defence industry body: TB2 drones, ground control stations, 600 warheads and in-country technical support. In August 2026 Le Monde described Türkiye as the Sudanese army's main military backer, with Saudi financing. President Erdoğan received General al-Burhan in Ankara in June 2026. Ankara denies any direct delivery. According to Chatham House, drone strikes by all belligerents combined accounted for more than 80% of the 880 civilian deaths documented in Sudan between January and April 2026. On 20 August 2026 Chad accused the Sudanese army of striking a convoy more than one hundred kilometres inside its territory; nothing establishes that a Turkish-made aircraft was used. Chad thus finds itself both a partner of Türkiye and exposed to a conflict in which, according to this reporting, Turkish equipment is used by one of the belligerents. Lastly, the Critical Threats Project notes that contracts concluded in Niger and Somalia benefit companies close to the Turkish government, which it presents as a governance issue; the concessions described in Section I, awarded by direct negotiation or criticised locally for their lack of transparency, fall under the same observation.

Dependence on the Libyan parameter. The holding of the December summit in Tripoli, the reach of the maritime memorandum and access to the Sahel through southern Libya depend on a process of institutional unification that Türkiye supports but does not control. The ratification of 20 October strengthened Ankara's position in the Eastern Mediterranean and revived the opposition of Greece, Egypt and the European Union. An African engagement whose main anchor point is a divided state remains dependent on that division.

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Indicators to watch

20 November 2026 — Close of COP31: any Turkish announcement on a climate cooperation mechanism with Africa, and on its financing.

8-9 December 2026 — Tripoli summit: level of representation of the Francophone African states, content of the declaration and action plan, security conditions.

November-December 2026 — Follow-up to BAMEX 2026: any announcement of an order, notably from Mali, and any commitment on local production or maintenance.

End of 2026 — Niger: arrival, numbers and location of the Turkish instructors; arrangements for coexistence with the Africa Corps and the Algerian contingent.

Ongoing — Mali: follow-up to the Human Rights Watch and The Sentry reports; decisions by component-supplying states on their licences; any Turkish statement on the conditions of use of drones.

Ongoing — Mali: outcome of the US-Malian discussions on surveillance flights, and how they relate to Turkish and Russian assets.

2027 — Burkina Faso: conclusion of the defence and security agreement raised on 20 October; political consultations session in Ouagadougou.

Ongoing — Chad: settlement of arrears, availability of the drones, format of French cooperation, spillover from the Sudanese conflict.

Ongoing — Libya: implementation of the maritime memorandum; Greek, Egyptian and European reactions; progress of institutional unification.

Ongoing — Türkiye: ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty, a procedure declared ongoing since 2013.

Early 2027 — Türkiye-Africa trade figures for 2026: distance from the $50 billion target, share of sub-Saharan Francophone Africa, progress towards $1 billion with Senegal.

Ongoing — Algeria-Türkiye: coordination or competition in Niger; place of the Sahel in the next bilateral consultations.

Implications

For Turkish decision-makers. The limits identified in this issue do not stem from the design of the offer; they stem from points that public decision can address. Six of them fall within Ankara's sole competence.

- **Conditions of use.** The regime of Law No. 5201 controls the destination of materiel, not its use. Publishing use and reporting clauses attached to sales of armed drones, and writing them into the authorisations issued by the Ministry of National Defence, would give Türkiye a position it can invoke when the use of its equipment is contested. It would also set Türkiye apart from its two direct competitors, which have none.
- **The decision-making chain in Mali.** If the elements reported by The Sentry are accurate, Turkish systems are being employed under Russian approval. This is a matter for dialogue with Bamako and, in the foreign minister's own terms, for consultations with Moscow. The credibility of the distinction between Türkiye's offer and the Russian deployment depends on

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it.

- **Components under foreign licence.** The recommendations addressed to component-supplying states target the point in the industrial chain that Türkiye does not control. The risk concerns the manufacturer's exports as a whole, not the Malian market alone. It is addressed through domestic substitution of components and through the previous point.
- **Contested files.** The denials issued in response to the SADAT and Sudan allegations run to one sentence; the allegations fill entire reports. A documented response (the company's status, authorised activities, the regime governing deliveries to Sudan) falls to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence. Ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty, signed in 2013, would have the same effect at a more general level.
- **Financing of sustainment.** The Chadian case shows that a fleet sold without a plan for financing its use turns against the seller. Türk Eximbank's buyer credits and its shareholding in the Africa Finance Corporation offer a framework; no instrument is currently dedicated to sustaining the systems delivered.
- **Francophone Africa and the civilian dimension.** The widest gap between stated objectives and measured results lies in this area. The instruments that produce lasting effects there are civilian: the Niamey hospital, schools, concessions, scholarships. The Tripoli summit and the follow-up to COP31 are the two occasions on which a quantified commitment on investment, health and energy can be made. Protecting nationals and civilian facilities against the JNIM threat is its corollary.

For African public decision-makers. Türkiye's offer widens the options for equipment and training, on timescales and terms that other suppliers do not propose. Four contractual points determine its value: the cost of ownership over time, not the acquisition price alone; a verifiable timetable for autonomy in maintenance and operation; symmetry in force majeure clauses, which the Malian contract does not provide; and rules of use and oversight, which the buyer has an interest in setting itself. Procurement by a security service, outside the defence budget and outside audit, weakens the purchasing state's position as much as the seller's. The Chadian precedent shows that a fleet acquired without a plan for financing its use does not deliver the expected capability.

For economic actors. In Francophone Africa the Turkish presence consists first of all of construction companies and concession operators; the bilateral frameworks created in 2025-2026 with Senegal and Niger target trade flows that are currently low. Niger's mining and energy sectors are covered by framework agreements whose implementation remains to be observed. The climate dimension (renewables, storage, irrigation) opens a field in which Turkish companies have references and in which multilateral financing can compensate for the weakness of bilateral financing. The security risk to Turkish interests in the central Sahel must be assessed taking into account JNIM's naming of Türkiye.

For third-party partners. Türkiye does not occupy the place left by France and does not contest Russia's function of protecting regimes. It positions itself in equipment, training and civilian networks, where it competes with China in armaments and, since summer 2026, operates alongside Algeria in Niger and the United States in Mali. European partners who regard this presence as competition have, in training and financing, means that Türkiye lacks and, through component licences, a lever over its industry. Using that lever would probably accelerate the domestic substitution of components and weaken the lever itself. The Chadian case indicates that the region's states combine offers rather than substitute them.

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Annex 1. Chronology, 2024-2026

April 2024 — Delivery of about a dozen TB2 and Akıncı drones to Burkina Faso.

15 August 2024 — Signature of the Malian Akıncı contract by the director general of ANSE ($210 million, six aircraft).

October 2024 — Türkiye-Niger mining memorandum.

January 2025 — Türkiye-Chad agreement; use of the Abéché facility.

April 2025 — Algerian air defence shoots down a Malian Akıncı; rupture between Algiers and Bamako.

July-August 2025 — Military and financial cooperation agreement with Niger; additional protocol with Senegal.

November 2025 — First edition of the BAMEX exhibition in Bamako.

27 February 2026 — US sanctions on Malian officials lifted.

7 April 2026 — Türkiye-Niger protocol on the deployment of instructors.

25 April 2026 — Coordinated attacks in Mali; condemnation by Ankara.

7 May 2026 — First session of the Algeria-Türkiye High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council.

3-5 June 2026 — General Tiani's visit to Ankara; four texts signed.

28-30 August 2026 — Niamey mutiny, put down with the Africa Corps; Algerian combat aircraft dispatched.

16 September 2026 — The Sentry's report on the air war in Mali.

1 October 2026 — AFP report on Chad's arrears and the grounding of drones.

19-22 October 2026 — Human Rights Watch reports on Mali.

20 October 2026 — Türkiye-Burkina Faso political consultations; ratification of the maritime memorandum by Libya's House of Representatives.

21-31 October 2026 — Algeria-Niger military protocol, parliamentary authorisation, entry of an Algerian column into Niger.

9-13 November 2026 — Second edition of BAMEX; AFRICOM commander received in Bamako (10 November).

9-20 November 2026 — COP31 in Antalya.

8-9 December 2026 — Fourth Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit, Tripoli.

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Annex 2. Turkish instruments by country, Francophone Africa

Record of documented instruments

Country	Security	Economy and infrastructure	Civilian and political frameworks
Niger	TB2 (2022), Hürkuş, armoured vehicles; training agreement (2020); military and financial agreement (2025); protocol on instructors (7 April 2026)	Niamey airport (Summa); mining memorandum (2024); $273 million of trade; joint economic committee (2026)	Friendship Hospital; Maarif schools; TİKA (irrigation, agriculture, livestock); diplomatic consultations (2026)
Mali	TB2 (December 2022), Akıncı (2024 contract); special forces courses; BAMEX exhibition (2025, 2026)	No major concession identified	Covered by TİKA's Dakar office
Burkina Faso	TB2 (2022), Akıncı (2024); defence agreement sought by Ankara	No major concession identified	Political consultations (20 October 2026); covered by TİKA's Dakar office
Chad	Hürkuş, Anka, Aksungur (2023-2024); Abéché facility (2025)	Arrears of $50 million according to AFP; denied	—
Senegal	Additional protocol on military and financial cooperation (August 2025)	Blaise Diagne airport (Limak-Summa, 25-year concession); $400-500 million of trade, target of $1 billion	TİKA regional office; joint commission (6th session, April 2026)
Guinea	—	Conventional terminal of the port of Conakry (Albayrak, 2018); extension of Conakry airport (2023)	—

This record includes only the instruments cited in this issue and documented by the sources listed under Methodology; it is not exhaustive.

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Annex 3. State of the evidence on contested files

What the sources establish, and the Turkish response

File	Sources	State of the evidence	Response of the Turkish authorities
Drone strikes that killed civilians in Burkina Faso (2023)	Human Rights Watch (January 2024)	Established by investigation; aircraft identified as TB2s	No public statement identified
Drone strikes that killed civilians in Mali (2024-2026)	Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, ACLED, Jeune Afrique and Bellingcat	Strikes established; type of aircraft not specified in the 2026 cases	No public statement identified
Malian Akıncı contract ($210 million, ANSE)	The Sentry, based on the contract published by Jeune Afrique	Contract document published; origin of the funds not documented	No public statement identified
Approval of strikes by Russian officers in Mali	The Sentry (earlier investigation, testimonies)	Single source, not corroborated	Not applicable to date
Syrian fighters recruited for Niger; role of SADAT	Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, reported by AFP, the BBC and Voice of America	Not independently verified	Denied by the Ministry of National Defence (May 2024) and by SADAT (July 2024); no reply from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the BBC
Training by SADAT of presidential protection units in Mali	Jeune Afrique (2024)	Single source	General denial by the company
Drone deliveries to the Sudanese army	Washington Post (documents, March 2025); Le Monde (August 2026)	Documents published in the press; presence of Turkish-made aircraft reported by several sources	Any direct delivery denied
Grounding of drones in Chad over unpaid bills	AFP (1 October 2026), Le Monde	Anonymous source	Denied by a senior Chadian officer; no Turkish position identified
Procurement of equipment by Russian paramilitaries through Türkiye	Control Risks analyst cited by RFI	Not confirmed	Not applicable to date

Methodology and sources

This issue relies exclusively on open sources. Documents consulted directly: The Sentry's report of 16 September 2026; Human Rights Watch releases of 29 June and 22 October 2026; Chatham House's analysis of 20 May 2026; the Turkish foreign minister's interview of 2 July 2026 and the ministry's page on arms control; Türkiye's statements to the Conferences of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (2023, 2025); Anadolu Agency reports; SETA's analysis of August 2026; Critical Threats Project notes (April 2026); documents from ACI Africa and the concession-holding companies. Official sources: Turkish Ministry of Trade (statements of 3 November 2026), Turkish Presidency (4 June 2026), Algérie Presse Service, Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presidencies and ministries of Niger, Burkina Faso and Senegal. African press: Sidwaya, Burkina24, ActuNiger, Tamtaminfo, Le Soleil, Seneweb, Tchadinfos, Le Pays (N'Djamena), Financial Afrik, The Libya Observer, Agence Ecofin, Military Africa. International press: AFP, Reuters, RFI, Jeune Afrique, BBC, Middle East Eye. Data: SIPRI (March 2026), ACLED. Studies: Atlantic Council, Institute for Security Studies, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Foreign Policy Research Institute, CERI-Sciences Po (Balcı and Binaté, 2026). The Human Rights Watch report of 19 October 2026, the Le Monde and Washington Post articles and the Jeune

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Afrique-Bellingcat investigation were consulted through identified secondary reports, notably Reuters. Law No. 5201 and its regulation are cited as presented in the specialist literature. Turkish official figures are cited as such and have not been independently cross-checked. Where the text notes the absence of a Turkish statement on a file, this means that our research did not identify one, not that none exists. Drafting was completed on 12 November 2026, before the close of the BAMEX exhibition and of COP31 and before the Tripoli summit.

Stratigma is a strategic intelligence and consulting firm based in Istanbul, specialising in the analysis of political and economic dynamics in Africa and Southeast Asia. **Stratigma L'Afrique** is its monthly French-language series of pan-African analysis. Reference issue for the assessment criteria: Issue 3, September 2026, “Moscou en Afrique : l'Africa Corps et les limites du modèle”. Next issue: Issue 6, December 2026. Contact: stratigma.org · © Stratigma 2026. Reproduction permitted with attribution.